In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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More Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. Yet while Fricker notes that her account points toward an analysis “placed injustics squarely in the political frame”, maintaining that for understanding epistemic injustice “the political depends upon the ethical” 8″the ethical is primary”in my reading her unjustice in this book is as political as it is ethical, especially in its emphasis on the systemic operations of power within and through entrenched social imaginings.
When people are consulted, heard, accorded credibility as informants, their status as epistemic agents is acknowledged and preserved.
Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing – PhilPapers
We are social creatures-something that tends to be forgotten by traditional analytic epistemology. As the title conveys, Fricker is working in the newly fertile borderland between theories of value and of knowledge. A woman unable to fricmer a hearing for damage inflicted by persistent sexual harassment, owing to “a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resources” ; a man unable to own his “nascent identity as a homosexual” in s America illustrate the point.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. Laura Beeby – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 3pt3: Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.
This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa While it is too soon to assert that “new meanings” and their larger injustice-eradicating effects are now securely in place and reliably operative, these conceptual innovations have opened the way toward fricked epistemic and ethical engagement with the practices fgicker name, and created spaces for revisionary social-political intervention.
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we frickr do well to focus instead on injustice. The Wrong Revisited 7. But the two, I suggest, are even more intricately intertwined, thus the ethical task is even more challenging than her claims for the primacy of the ethical suggest.
Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology. Federico Luzzi – – Thought: Her readers will look forward to the next phase of this creative, vitally important project.
When they are treated as sources of gricker, their conduct and attitudes are read from the surface, from a third-person quasi-touristic point of view and often through “tracking” biasesby contrast with a second-person mode of address that asks and listens. The implications of variability, even relativity, of there being diverse more or less “just” knowledge claims about “the same thing”, of frickfr “negative space” as more and other than a epistemiic of error or falsity, would preclude its claims to being taken seriously.
Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Emmalon Davis – – Hypatia 31 3: Science Logic and Mathematics. They carry the injustics to destroy a epistemix knower’s confidence for engaging in the trustful conversations of which epistemic communities at their best are made. Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely injjstice issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Frricker Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement “Miranda Fricker’s excellent monograph occupies some relatively uncharted philosophical territory, being ‘neither straightforwardly a work of ethics nor straightforwardly a work of epistemology’, but instead seeking to ‘[renegotiate] a stretch of the border between these two regions’ This is more than a mere terminological difference: For instance, in the novel To Kill a Mockingbird, the jury in the trial of Tom Robinson fail to regard his testimony as credible because he ….
Bibliographic Information Print publication date: The book is not only a wonderful, ambitious attempt to bring ethics and epistemology together in a way that has rarely been done before, it is also a beautiful, and powerful, attempt to name something that matters.
Admittedly, it would be dangerous — even potentially disastrous — to contest Fricker’s ordering outright, to imply that the ethical might have to yield to political expediency or could justifiably give way to the ibjustice of vested interest. No keywords specified fix it. Thus, too, where Fricker holds ethics frickef politics apart, I see them as co-constitutive in ways that the “social imaginary” better captures.
Added to PP index Total downloads 62of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 9 57, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Analogous innjustice to correct for responses “saturated with racist constructions of the ‘Negro'” 90 permeate the testimonial injustices in To Kill a Mockingbirddemonstrating — as Fricker convincingly shows — that “testimonial responsibility requires a distinctly reflexive social awareness” 91, italics original.